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HISTORICAL RETROSPECTIVE AND THE
FUTURE ROLE AND JURISDICTION OF
THE U.S. COURT OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM
Stephen M. De Luca, Esq.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The opening Plenary Session of the Eleventh Judicial
Conference of the United States Court of International Trade
("CIT") addressed the CIT's likely future role and jurisdiction
in the interpretation and enforcement of international trade
relations in the new millennium.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a historical retro-
spective on the CIT and its predecessors and the laws which
they interpret and enforce. It also will provide a general over-
view of the institutions and international trade agreements
which govern the determination and collection of customs du-
ties and the use of domestic and international remedies to
ameliorate unfair foreign trade practices. It introduces subjects
concerning the impact on the CIT's jurisdiction and standard of
review. The paper addresses the CIT's role within the U.S.
government and among other international trade dispute set-
tlement systems, as well as the role of decisions by the Su-
preme Court of the United States, dispute settlement panels
and appellate bodies of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment ("NAFTA") and the World Trade Organization ("WTO").
Moreover, it will address the impact that NAFTA and WTO
agreements have had on the reduction of customs duties and
the now more limited discretion that national governments and
their agencies have in the development of trade laws and regu-
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Middlebrooks & Shapiro, P.C. in New Jersey. Mr. DeLuca has a J.D. from Pace
University School of Law, an LL.M, with distinction, from Tulane Law School, and
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lations, and their interpretation and enforcement. Thus, the
question posed is whether there will be a much reduced sub-
stantive role for the CIT to play with respect to international
trade relations.
II. HISTORY OF THE CIT AND ITS PREDECESSORS
The First Congress of the United States, in only the sec-
ond of its legislative pronouncements, passed the Tariff Act of
July 14, 1789. Its purposes were stated to be "for the support
of government, for the discharge of the debts of the United
States, and for the encouragement and protection of manufac-
tures."' It set forth tariff schedules and imposed duties on
numerous imported goods which were collected by customs
officers at each of the ports of entry throughout the United
States. The July 14, 1789 Act was amended by the Act of July
31, 1789, and the Tariff Act of March 2, 1799.2
At that time, there was no judicial body or administrative
agency with jurisdiction, to review decisions of the collector
with respect to customs duties. However, in one of its earlier
decisions, the Supreme Court of the United States found that
importers had a right of action in assumpsit under the com-
mon law to recover excess duties from the collectors personally,
because of erroneous classification determinations.' This deci-
sion was based in principal part upon the decision from Lord
Mansfield in Campbell v. Hall.4 In 1833, Congress enacted the
Tariff Act of March 2, 1833, giving federal courts original juris-
diction of disputes over determinations of customs officers.'
When customs collectors began to hoard contested duties,
Congress enacted the Act of March 3, 1839, requiring collectors
to turn over disputed customs payments to the Treasury of the
United States and the Secretary of the Treasury to refund
duties found to be erroneously collected.6 The Supreme Court
then determined, in Cary v. Curtis, that this Act eliminated
the common law right of assumpsit, thus leaving the resolution
1. Tariff Act of July 14, 1789, 1 Stat. 24 (repealed 1789).
2. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29; Tariff Act of 1799, ch. 22, 1 Stat.
627.
3. See Elliot v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137, 158 (1836).
4. 98 Eng. Rep. 1045 (KB. 1774).
5. Tariff Act of 1833, ch. 57, § 2, 4 Stat. 632.
6. Act of March 3, 1839, ch. 82, § 45, 5 Stat. 339.
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of customs disputes within the sole discretion of the Secretary
of the Treasury.7 Six days later, however, a bill was intro-
duced in the U.S. Senate to restore this right against the col-
lector.' Thirty days later, Congress passed the Act of February
26, 1845, which not only restored this right to challenge such
determinations, but provided a statutory right to a jury trial
against the collector as well.'
In 1890, Congress abolished the statutory right of action
and created the Board of General Appraisers ("Board"), whose
nine members within the Department of the Treasury heard
appeals of classification and appraisement determinations by
the customs officers in the various ports of entry." The
Board's decisions with respect to classification were made sub-
ject to judicial review in the circuit courts, based on the record
made before the Board. This role of the circuit courts was re-
placed by Congress with the Court of Customs Appeals, by the
Act of August 5, 1909." The 1909 Act gave this Court "ex-
clusive appellate jurisdiction" to review classification and other
"non-appraisement" cases. "
In 1926, Congress changed the name of the Board to the
United States Customs Court and its role from that of an ad-
ministrative body to a judicial one as well." In 1929, the
name of the Court of Customs Appeals was changed to the
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
("C.C.P.A."), when Congress expanded its jurisdiction to in-
clude appeals from determinations made by the U.S. Patent
Office (now the Patent and Trademark Office).
In 1929, the Supreme Court ruled, in Ex parte Bakelite
Corp., that the United States Customs Court and the C.C.P.A.
were legislative Article I courts.'4 However, Congress de-
clared, in the Act of August 25, 1958," that both were Article
III courts, and a few years later, the decision in Bakelite was
7. See 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 239-52 (1845).
8. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 195 (1845).
9. Act of Feb. 26, 1845, ch. 22, 5 Stat. 727.
10. See Tariff Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 567.
11. Act of August 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 29, 36 Stat. 11, 105.
12. Id. at 106.
13. See Tariff Act of May 28, 1926, ch. 411, 44 Stat. 669.
14. 279 U.S. 438, 460 (1929).
15. Act of Aug. 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-755, § 1, 72 Stat. 848 (1958).
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overruled by the Supreme Court in Glidden v. Zdanok.6 In
1970, Congress passed the Customs Courts Act of 1970, which
denominated seven types of decisions subject to protest by
importers and reformed the procedures used in customs litiga-
tion. 7
In 1980, Congress passed the Customs Courts Act of 1980
("1980 Act"), which expanded the jurisdiction of the United
States Customs Court and changed its name once again to the
one currently used-the United States Court of International
Trade ("CIT").' 8 The CIT was then granted all the powers in
law and equity of the district courts, including the power to
enter money judgments, to remand determinations to agencies
for further action consistent with the Court's rulings, and to
grant any other relief available in the district courts. The CIT
also was granted jurisdiction over review of antidumping and
countervailing duty ("AD/CVD") determinations, which had
previously been subject to judicial review in the district courts.
The 1980 Act also reaffirmed the de novo standard of review in
customs cases and the very deferential standard of review in
AD/CVD cases. 9
The sponsor of the 1980 Act, Senator Dennis DeConcini,
stated that the purpose of the Act was to "eliminate the consid-
erable jurisdictional confusion" that existed for trade practitio-
ners as to which of the federal courts had jurisdiction over
various types of trade disputes, and to "increase the availabili-
ty of judicial review in the field of international trade in a
manner which results in uniformity without sacrificing the
expeditious resolution of import-related disputes."0 The Presi-
dent, when signing the bill into law, stated that the 1980 Act
created "a comprehensive system for judicial review of civil
actions arising out of import transactions and federal statutes
affecting international trade."2' Despite these pronounce-
ments, the confusion which the 1980 Act was intended to ame-
16. 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
17. Customs Courts Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-271, § 110, 84 Stat. 274.
18. Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 201, 94 Stat. 1727.
19. See id. at 1728-29.
20. 126 CONG. REc. 27,063 (1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini), quoted in 19
U.S.C. §§ 25, 27 note (1980) (Litigation Before the United States Court of Inter-
national Trade).
21. Id. at xxvii (quoting President's Statement on Signing S. 1654 Into Law,
16 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 2183 (Oct. 11, 1980)).
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liorate still has not been completely resolved, even now as we
celebrate nearly twenty years of jurisprudence under the 1980
Act.
III. THE CURRENT JURISDICTION OF THE CIT
The jurisdiction of the CIT is delineated in 28 U.S.C. §§
1581-1585. It encompasses civil actions brought by import-
ers and interested parties to review adverse U.S. agency deci-
sions concerning import matters.' Actions brought by the
United States to recover civil penalties, to recover upon a bond
relating to the importation of merchandise, and to recover cus-
toms duties, are also included.'
In addition to reviewing customs determinations' and
AD/CVD decisions of the U.S. Department of Commerce, Inter-
national Trade Administration ("ITA"), and the U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission ("ITC"),2 the CIT also reviews deci-
sions by the Secretary of the Treasury concerning customs
broker's licenses,27 by the Secretary of Commerce or the Sec-
retary of Labor concerning eligibility for trade adjustment
assistance under the Trade Act of 1974,2' and by the ITA and
ITC concerning requests for confidential information. 9 It also
has exclusive jurisdiction "to render judgment upon any coun-
terclaim, crossclaim, or third-party action of any party,"0 and
any civil action "commenced by the United States to enforce
administrative sanctions levied for violation of a protective
order or an undertaking."'
The grant of jurisdiction that has created some confusion
is embodied in § 1581(i), the residual jurisdiction clause, under
which the CIT is empowered to entertain
any civil action commenced against the United States, its
agencies, or its officers, that arises out of any law of the
22. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581-1585 (1994).
23. See id. § 1581.
24. See id. § 1582.
25. See id. § 1581(a), (b).
26. See 1d. § 1581(c).
27. See id. § 1581(g).
28. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(d) (1994).
29. See id. § 1581(f).
30. Id. § 1583.
31. Id. § 1585.
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United States provided for:
(1) revenue from imports or tonnage;
(2) tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation
of merchandise for reasons other than the raising of
revenue;
(3) embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the
importation of merchandise for reasons other than the
protection of the public health or safety; or
(4) administration and enforcement with respect to the
matters referred to in paragraphs (1)-(3) of this subsec-
tion and subsections (a)-(h) of this section.3 2
To be certain, Congress included the following language in
subsection (i):
This subsection shall not confer jurisdiction over an
antidumping or countervailing duty determination which is
reviewable either by the Court of International Trade under
section 516A(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 [19 U.S.C. §
1516a(a)] or by a binational panel under article 1904 of the
North American Free Trade Agreement or the United States-
Canada Free-Trade Agreement and section 516a(g) of the
Tariff Act of 1930 [19 U.S.C. § 151a(g)]."3
This clause has been the subject of much litigation in the CIT
and its appellate court, the Federal Circuit, and has caused
some confusion and consternation by international trade prac-
titioners, scholars, and the courts as well.
In addition, there are a number of international trade
matters that are not currently subject to CIT jurisdiction or for
which there is continued debate as to whether they fall within
the residual clause, are subject to review in the Federal Circuit
or the district courts, or are not subject to judicial review alto-
gether. For example, the question remains whether the CIT
has or should have jurisdiction over export matters or whether
they properly belong in the district courts.34 Section 337 ac-
tions concerning unfair trade practices such as imports that
32. Id. § 1581(i).
33. Id.
34. See Dean A. Pinkert & Thomas D. Blanford, Judicial Control of Export
Control Determinations, 26 BROOK. J. INTL L. 843 (2001). See also F. Amanda
DeBusk, Role of Judicial Review in Administrative Enforcement Cases, 26 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 853 (2001).
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violate U.S.-held intellectual property rights are subject to
review by the Federal Circuit on appeal from the ITC. 5 Sec-
tion 301 actions are commenced by petition with the Office of
the United States Trade Representative ("USTR) and are not
subject to judicial review." Disputes as to the constitutional-
ity of NAFTA's chapter 19 procedure are subject to review in
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGIME
The interpretation and enforcement of U.S. trade law does
not operate in a vacuum. There are a number of regional,
plurilateral and multilateral agreements and institutions that
govern international trade relations which have an impact on
U.S. trade law and the settlement of international disputes.
This section examines the historical evolution of the global
trade regime and the rights and remedies that have developed
therein.
The evolution of the global trade regime must be under-
stood against the history of the use of mercantilism by most
states to warp trade in favor of their own traders. According to
some historians such as Alfred Eckes, in his book "Opening
America's Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776,""s
this was true with respect to the United States as well as
many of its current trading partners:
Before the New Deal the United States prospered behind
high protective tariffs and used a variety of import restric-
tions to shelter home market producers from competition,
much the way Asian countries have done successfully since
World War II... In the late nineteenth century ... a protec-
tionist America and a protectionist Germany both outper-
formed free trade Britain. 9
In the 1920s, the U.S. economy was doing well but the
speculative boom in the stock market was unsustainable. The
United Kingdom's economy stalled because of asymmetrical
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994).
36. See id. § 2645.
37. See id. § 1295.
38. ALFRED ECKES, OPENING AMERICA'S MARKET: U.S. FOREIGN TRADE POLICY
SINCE 1776 (1995).
39. Id. at xvii.
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openness, which led to heavy unemployment and obsolescent
industries. The U.K. then implemented the Safeguarding of
Industries Act of 1921.4o In 1929, the stock market crash in
the United States aggravated the slowdown in the European
economy and most of the world suffered greater restrictions on
trading activity. The United States then implemented Smoot-
Hawley tariffs, which provided protection to U.S. industries
and extended such protection to agriculture.4'
In 1939, Japan and Germany began to use Keynesian
pump-driving deficits to stimulate their economies, although
both nations were responsible for starting World War II. Not
until the war mobilization effort did some Europeans and then
the United States begin to use Keynesian economics, too. Near
the conclusion of the war, the Allies called a conference in
1944 in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to organize the peace.
The Bretton Woods deal would have two dimensions: fi-
nance and trade. The financial dimension consisted of the
International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), which was to have
enough reserves to be able to stabilize currency fluctuations
but was inadequately funded, and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (the 'World Bank"), which
would be used to help reconstruction and development efforts
to rebuild Europe.4' There was to be lending to developing
countries as well, but because the World Bank was undercapi-
talized, this financial system's aims had to be limited. The
trade dimension consisted of an International Trade Organiza-
tion ("ITO") proposed by the U.S. Department of State, but the
U.S. Congress did not approve it. Instead, the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), which was negotiated to
reduce tariffs and lock in these concessions until the ITO was
to enter into force, became the modest institution that was to
govern trade until the creation of the World Trade Organiza-
tion in 1995.43
40. Safeguarding of Industries Act of 1921, 11 & 12 Geo. 5, c. 47 (Eng.).
41. Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (1930).
42. See JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND
JURISPRUDENCE 12-27 (1994).
43. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947]. On Apr. 15, 1994, GATT
was incorporated into the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO] as GATT
1994 in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement [hereinafter GATT 1994].
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The GATT 1947 agreement came into force with the Proto-
col on Provisional Application." This allowed pre-existing na-
tional legislation to stand despite any inconsistency with GATT
obligations. The GATT 1947 became the forum for a limited
series of tariff reduction negotiation rounds and for the devel-
opment of a diplomatic form of dispute resolution. During the
first five rounds, the GATT 1947 remained as such; but with
the Kennedy Round, the United States raised its concerns with
two aspects of European Economic Community ("EEC") policy:
its common external tariff and common agricultural policy,
both of which the United States feared would lead to EEC
evasion of its obligations under the successful previous GATT
1947 rounds.45 The Nixon (renamed Tokyo) Round led to the
adoption of several Multinational Trade Negotiation ("MTN")
Codes on dumping and subsidies, for example, and lower for-
mal Japanese tariff levels comparable to those in the United
States and Europe.46 Developing countries sought greater ac-
cess to developed country markets and permission to form com-
modity cartels like the successful OPEC oil cartels. The ap-
pearance of progress was maintained.
An effort by the United States in 1981-82 to open another
round to extend GATT 1947 to services and intellectual proper-
ty died early. The Latin American debt overload crisis threat-
ened the financing system, especially the top ten United States
banks whose capital cover had become increasingly narrow. To
maintain the banking system, additional loans had to be made
to Lesser Developed Countries ("LDCs") to pay their debts;
some were partly written down, some were privatized.47 By
switching debt to equity, bankers became asset bankers. This
financing scheme renewed interest in what was to be called
the Uruguay Round.
The Uruguay Round was opened with aspirations to fur-
ther lower tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers, to open mar-
kets, to extend the scope of the rules to cover services and
44. Protocol on Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 2041.
45. See JEFFREY THOMAS & MICHAEL MEYER, THE NEW RULES OF GLOBAL
TRADE 6 (1997); JOHN JACKSON ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND 12-26,
50-52 (1984).
46. See THOMAS & MEYER, supra note 45, at 9-12.
47. See Rumu Sarkar, Development Law and International Finance, in 10
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LAW 98-112 (1999).
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intellectual property, and to liberalize agriculture, among other
things. The United States also sought more certainty in dis-
pute settlement by "legalizing" it-making panel decisions
have more binding legal effect-and providing more
automaticity to the system. The global trade regime also expe-
rienced growing regionalism-not only with the EEC, but also
NAFTA, ASEAN, ANDEAN, Mercosur and others-as well as
the collapse of Communism. In the end, though, serious asym-
metrical openness was locked into the system and national
trade remedies were limited. This was to the advantage of
multinational enterprises ("MNEs") and international bankers,
but some saw social problems and major disruptions to nation-
al industries, among other concerns.
The international trade regime was based on Smithian
free trade theory, which holds that free trade promotes mutual
gains through greater specialization.48 GATT 1947 was in-
tended to facilitate free trade by providing a forum for reduc-
ing tariffs and non-tariff barriers and negotiating rules of non-
discrimination. In addition to tariff reductions in schedules of
concessions," the key features of GATT 1947 were "uncondi-
tional" most favored nation treatment,50 and national treat-
ment,5" as well as other "non-discrimination" rules,52 the dis-
couragement of quotas," with exceptions for agriculture and
fisheries, 4 and theatrical showing of films." General excep-
tions were made for health, safety, consumer protection, and
national treasures (culture);6 a specific exception was made
for national security. 7 The early GATT was used to block
dumping and subsidies for exports. Laws against dumping and
subsidies had existed since the turn of the century and loop-
holes for their use as offsets were left in GATT 1947. Other
48. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIoNS 121-23 (Penguin Books ed.
1974) (1776).
49. See GATT 1947, supra note 43, at art. II.
50. Id. at art. I.
51. See id. at art. III.
52. Id. at arts. V, XII, XVII.
53. See id. at art. XI.
54. See id.
55. See GATT 1947, supra note 43, at art. IV.
56. See id. at art. XX.
57. See id. at art. XXI.
58. See id. at art. VI.
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offsets were the allowance of balance of payments restraints,59
exchange rate agreements,60 subsidies for economic develop-
6 62ment,6' and safeguards measures.
Offsets and loopholes in GATT 1947 allowed for national
trade law remedies to limit disruptions from imports because
of unfair trade practices (dumping or subsidization) or a surge
of imports (safeguards/escape clause) that injure or threaten to
injure a domestic industry.
Antidumping law, for example, imposes penalty duties on
unfairly priced imports, defined as those that are priced in the
United States lower than they are sold in the country of export
or a comparable third country, or based on a constructed price
analysis. 6' The U.S. Department of Commerce, ITA, makes a
determination on whether the product at issue is unfairly
dumped.' The ITC must determine whether the "unfairly
dumped" product has caused or is likely to cause "material
injury" to an established U.S. industry or materially retards
the establishment of a U.S. industry.65 Under the trade agree-
ments and U.S. law in force prior to the Uruguay Round, this
determination was required only if the product was from a
country that was a contracting party to the GATT or the
Antidumping Code or any other agreement committing the
country to similar obligations.6
If the determinations of the ITA and the ITC are both
affirmative, the ITA issues an antidumping order requiring the
Customs Service to obtain a deposit or bond equal to the mar-
gin by which the product is "dumped" in addition to the normal
customs duties assessed on the product.67
An "interested party" may request an administrative re-
59. See id. at art. XII.
60. See id. at art. XV,
61. See GAT 1947, supra note 43, at arts. XVI, XVIII.
62. See id. at art. XIX.
63. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.212 (2000). See also Agreement on Implementation of
Article V of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, Annex 1A (1994) [hereinafter Anti-Dumping Measures], available
at http/www.wto.orgenglish/docs e/lega-e/final e.htm.
64. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.101 (2000).
65. 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (1994).
66. See SPENCER WEBER WALLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND U.S. ANTITRUST
LAW § 12.01-08 (1999).
67. 19 C.F.R. § 351.102 (2000).
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view conducted by the ITA.68 An injury determination by the
ITC is no longer required; however, under the Uruguay Round
agreements, a five-year "sunset" review must be made to deter-
mine whether revocation would lead to resumption of the un-
fair trade practice and consequent damage to a U.S. industry.
The ITA's review determines the actual margin for the period
examined. At that time the ITA orders Customs to liquidate
entries and assess the antidumping duties in addition to nor-
mal customs duties for the product. The process is essentially
the same for export subsidies, with the ITA determining
whether the government of a country or a foreign person is
providing a specific subsidy to aid exports.
There has been considerable disagreement over what con-
stitutes an actionable subsidy and over how to measure dump-
ing, e.g., which led among other things to the inclusion of chap-
ter 19 in the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement and
its successor, NAFTA.69 Under chapter 19, a complaining par-
ty who participated in the AD/CVD proceeding may challenge a
final determination of the ITA or ITC by invoking a three-per-
son panel dispute settlement system instead of appealing to
the U.S. Court of International Trade or its equivalent in Mex-
ico or Canada."0 The panel would be called upon to apply the
standard of review and substantive AD/CVD law of the mem-
ber country whose agency's decision is challenged. This system
has been celebrated as a success, though not as a model for fu-
ture trade agreements. In addition, there were some controver-
sial decisions, one of which concerned Canadian softwood lum-
ber products which survived an extraordinary challenge by the
United States complaining that the panel did not apply the
very deferential standard of review that the CIT would have
had to apply if the matter had been brought before it.7
The Uruguay Round agreements attempted to bring more
clarity, definition and hence certainty to what are
countervailable subsidies and dumping practices. However, it
68. Id.
69. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 19, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605
[hereinafter NAFTA].
70. See id. ch. 19.
71. See Certain Softwood Lumber Products From Canada: Notice of Panel
Decision, Revocation of Countervailing Duty Order and Termination of Suspension
of Liquidation, 59 Fed. Reg. 42,029-30 (Aug. 16, 1994). See also 19 U.S.C. §
1516(a) (1994).
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raised burdens of proof requirements for domestic petitioners
in AD/CVD proceedings. Domestic industries must now meet a
higher threshold to prove that they do indeed represent the
domestic industry. The agreements also weaken and limit the
use of anti-subsidy devices. Red light subsidies-those specifi-
cally to export industries or that impose domestic content re-
quirements as a condition for their being granted-are general-
ly impermissible and prohibited, except for LDCs. 2 Yellow (or
amber) light subsidies-specific subsidies causing appreciable
injury to a domestic industry-are actionable, but not for those
that are less than or equal to 2% of ad valorem value."3 Green
light subsidies-general or non-specific subsidies-are non-
actionable.74
Before GATT 1994, an AD/CVD order could be revoked
only if the ITA found in three successive annual reviews that
there was no unfair dumping or subsidization of the product
concerned and the ITC determined that revocation would not
harm a domestic industry."5 With GATT 1994, U.S. law now
provides for the "sunset review" of AD/CVD orders in existence
for five years, to determine whether revocation of the order
likely would lead to resumption of the unfair trade practice
and subsequent injury to a domestic industry."6 This places
an additional burden on domestic industries.
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 allows U.S. industries
"seriously harmed" by imports to obtain temporary relief
against all imports of a particular product from all coun-
tries."7 Remedies include quotas, supplementary duties, tariff-
rate quotas (supplemental duties that kick in after a certain
quota level is exceeded), and orderly marketing arrangements
(export limits negotiated by the U.S. with other countries).
However, its use has been very limited, as have adjustment
assistance programs for workers, industries or communities
affected by a surge in imports. The administrations apparently
disfavored use of the safeguard clause and the Tariff Commis-
sion (now the ITC) only occasionally found relief appropriate.
72. See GATT 1994, supra note 43.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (1994).
76. See GATT 1994, supra note 43.
77. Trade Act of 1974 § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (1994).
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Moreover, when it is used, compensation must be offered to all
other GATT 1994 parties, it must be non-discriminatory in its
application, and it must be granted for no more than five
years.
78
Section 337 is directed at other unfair import practices,
including infringement of patents, trademarks and copyrights;
antitrust-type violations; and other unfair acts or methods of
competition, such as false advertising and palming off."9 In
addition to showing the unfair practice, one must show the ITC
that the practice has the effect or tendency to cause "substan-
tial injury" to U.S. firms.8" The president has, sixty days to
reject any ITC decision granting relief.8' ITC determinations
are appealable directly to the Federal Circuit, bypassing the
Court of International Trade.82 However, once the determina-
tion is made and Customs attempts to enforce the order, an
importer may challenge the Customs action in the CIT.83
Although section 337 has been used as an effective tool for
intellectual property rights holders in the United States, a
GATT 1994 panel found that procedural advantages of a do-
mestic alleged infringer defending against an infringement
claim brought in a U.S. district court are absent for importers
of allegedly infringing goods who can be brought before the
ITC.' Claims against domestic infringers are not subject to
judicial review in the district court or in the ITC.8 Actions
brought before the ITC could be made in the alternative or in
addition to claims brought in the district courts as well.8" In
response to the adverse GATT ruling, the United States
amended section 337, thus making it a little weaker than be-
fore but still a better tool than other U.S. trade law reme-
dies. 7 A defendant may now pursue counterclaims that could
be removed to the district court and any claims then pending
would be stayed while the ITC conducts its investigation.88
78. See id.
79. Tariff Act of 1930 § 337, 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1994).
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See Tariff Act of 1930 § 337, 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1994).
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
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Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, and its 1979, 1984
and 1988 amendments, requires the United States Trade Rep-
resentative ("USTR") to investigate certain unfair trade prac-
tices of foreign countries and to identify them and analyze
their practices or policies that constitute "significant barriers"
to U.S. exports of goods or services in an annual Report of
National Trade Estimate ("NTE").s9 The USTR may impose
up to 100% additional duties on imports from the identified
countries." Special 301 actions may be brought for such for-
eign country practices concerning failure to enforce rights of
U.S. intellectual property rights holders.9' Use of this tool is
somewhat limited, but it is very controversial because of claims
that it violates principles of international law.92
Section 301 is perceived as having prompted the Japanese
to enter into an agreement with the Bush Administration-the
so-called "Structural Impediments Initiative" ("SII")-which
sought to address significant non-trade barriers in both coun-
tries.93 With the strengthened WTO and dispute settlement
system established under GATT 1994 and the principle that
trade disputes are to be settled in the multilateral forum pro-
vided by the Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU"), sec-
tion 301's utility and legitimacy are highly questionable.
In sum, the international trade regime has placed limits
on national government actors and domestic petitioners to use
domestic trade law remedies to curtail unfair foreign trade
practices. Moreover, the numerous GATT/WTO rounds have
reduced U.S. customs duties significantly, and the NAFTA
provides for a phased elimination of tariff and most nontariff
barriers on trade among Canada, Mexico and the United
States within ten years. Thus, although customs duties provid-
ed for the vast majority of revenues for the U.S. Treasury until
the U.S. Constitution was amended to allow for the collection
of income taxes, they are currently, with respect to most goods,
insignificant.
89. Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994) (amended 1979, 1984
and 1988).
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. Joint Report of U.S.-Japan Working Group on the Structural Impediments
Initiative, Tokyo, Japan (June 28, 1990).
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V. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
One recent development that will certainly have an impact
on the CIT's role in international trade relations is the decision
of the Supreme Court in United States v. Haggar Apparel Com-
pany.94 In that case, the Court determined that Customs
rulemaking determinations are entitled to deference despite
the statutory requirement that the CIT must decide cases
using a de novo standard of review and must reach the correct
result once the importer overcomes the statutory presumption
of correctness to which Customs determinations are entitled.95
Suffice it to say that there is some concern among the
Bench and the Bar that with such limits on judicial review of
customs rule-making determinations, heightened requirements
for domestic industries in AD/CVD determinations, and the
reduction of tariffs, there is likely to be a substantial reduction
in the load of cases for the CIT to decide in the near future.
On the other hand, there are a number of substantive
areas in which the CIT does not currently have jurisdiction
and for which some may suggest judicial review should reside
in the CIT.
For example, would it be appropriate to subject Section
301 actions to judicial review? Perhaps this review can be
limited to deciding whether a petitioner has met the require-
ments for the USTR to conduct an investigation. Some may
suggest that the CIT should have judicial review to determine
whether actions taken by agencies of the U.S. government and
by the various states are consistent with U.S. obligations un-
der international law. Some may suggest that the Court should
have jurisdiction over certain private international commercial
disputes as well-perhaps with regard to petitions for the
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and civil judgments
that are challenged on the basis that enforcement would vio-
late a fundamental public policy of the United States or the
subject matter is not properly subject to review by the arbitral
body or foreign court from which the decision was rendered.
Others may propose that the CIT's subject matter jurisdic-
tion should expand commensurate with that of the scope of the
WTO and other international trade agreements. One of the
94. 526 U.S. 380 (1999).
95. See id. at 493.
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other panels discussed the impact of globalization and the role
that the CIT has begun to have and is likely to have with
respect to social issues such as labor and the environment. No
doubt, the developments from the Ministerial Conference in
Seattle, Washington, just prior to the Judicial Conference, will
have an impact as well.
Alternatively, would it be appropriate to statutorily re-
quire the CIT to refer certain issues to the WTO for guidance
much like the highest national courts of the Members of the
European Community are required to refer such questions to
the Court of Justice of the European Communities - the so-
called "preliminary reference" procedure? This would certainly
raise objections under the political question doctrine - that
such referrals may interfere with the role of the Executive and
the Congress in deciding whether to comply with decisions of
WTO panels and the Appellate Body. The CIT and the Federal
Circuit, as well as the Implementation Act and the Statement
of Administrative Action, have determined that GATT/WTO
law and dispute settlement decisions do not have a direct ef-
fect, and only U.S. Congress may decide to change federal law
to bring it into compliance with the Uruguay Round agree-
ments.
Lastly, a comment on the role that technology and ad-
vanced communications will have on the practice before the
CIT. The CIT is a national court, with authorization to hold
trials anywhere in the country and evidentiary hearings
abroad. The CIT commonly decides cases based on the record
developed by the agencies below and the briefs submitted by
counsel, without the need for counsel and the parties to appear
before the Court for oral argument. With the advent of elec-
tronic filings and teleconferencing systems, what will it be like
for trade practitioners and the Bench when there will be even
less need to travel to New York City to make an appearance
and to participate in oral argument before the Court? In addi-
tion, there certainly will be ethical issues and other concerns
that must be addressed before such a system is put into place.
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